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	<title>Comments on: Password security hall of shame</title>
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	<link>http://blog.kamens.us/2009/09/29/password-security-hall-of-shame/</link>
	<description>Musings of an indignant mind</description>
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		<title>By: jik</title>
		<link>http://blog.kamens.us/2009/09/29/password-security-hall-of-shame/comment-page-1/#comment-105069</link>
		<dc:creator>jik</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Dec 2009 13:30:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.kamens.brookline.ma.us/~jik/wordpress/?p=931#comment-105069</guid>
		<description>They won&#039;t let you use &quot;q&quot; and &quot;z&quot; because they want you to be able to use the same password on the Web and on the phone, and some phones don&#039;t have &quot;q&quot; or &quot;z&quot; on them.  I hate to say it, but given that they want the password you pick to be useable on the phone, the restrictions they put on it are actually somewhat reasonable.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>They won&#8217;t let you use &#8220;q&#8221; and &#8220;z&#8221; because they want you to be able to use the same password on the Web and on the phone, and some phones don&#8217;t have &#8220;q&#8221; or &#8220;z&#8221; on them.  I hate to say it, but given that they want the password you pick to be useable on the phone, the restrictions they put on it are actually somewhat reasonable.</p>
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		<title>By: agodfrin</title>
		<link>http://blog.kamens.us/2009/09/29/password-security-hall-of-shame/comment-page-1/#comment-105066</link>
		<dc:creator>agodfrin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 07 Dec 2009 18:31:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.kamens.brookline.ma.us/~jik/wordpress/?p=931#comment-105066</guid>
		<description>Then there are also those sites that enforce really ridiculous rules for passwords, presumably thinking they make them safer.

My case in point is https://www.virtuallythere.com/ the system run by Sabre to check and manage any reservation done via Sabre.  The default access mechanism is just to enter your Sabre reservation code and passenger name. But you can also sign-up for a permanent login which I assume gives you access to more functions. 

When you try to sign up, you are asked to invent a password, but make sure you follow the following rules:

&quot;Should contain a minimum of 7 characters and maximum of 12 characters.
Should contain at least one numeric character.
The same character cannot appear more than twice in the password.
The same character should not repeat more than twice in a row.
There should be no spaces in the password.
The password cannot contain the characters Q,q,Z,z. &quot;

What&#039;s wrong with letters Q and Z ? Why would they not be allowed ?

Albert</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Then there are also those sites that enforce really ridiculous rules for passwords, presumably thinking they make them safer.</p>
<p>My case in point is <a href="https://www.virtuallythere.com/">https://www.virtuallythere.com/</a> the system run by Sabre to check and manage any reservation done via Sabre.  The default access mechanism is just to enter your Sabre reservation code and passenger name. But you can also sign-up for a permanent login which I assume gives you access to more functions. </p>
<p>When you try to sign up, you are asked to invent a password, but make sure you follow the following rules:</p>
<p>&#8220;Should contain a minimum of 7 characters and maximum of 12 characters.<br />
Should contain at least one numeric character.<br />
The same character cannot appear more than twice in the password.<br />
The same character should not repeat more than twice in a row.<br />
There should be no spaces in the password.<br />
The password cannot contain the characters Q,q,Z,z. &#8221;</p>
<p>What&#8217;s wrong with letters Q and Z ? Why would they not be allowed ?</p>
<p>Albert</p>
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		<title>By: jik</title>
		<link>http://blog.kamens.us/2009/09/29/password-security-hall-of-shame/comment-page-1/#comment-104994</link>
		<dc:creator>jik</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2009 03:50:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.kamens.brookline.ma.us/~jik/wordpress/?p=931#comment-104994</guid>
		<description>I think the point of the images is not to protect against sites that are doing a true man-in-the-middle attack, but rather against sites that are just putting up a look-alike dummy site and collecting usernames and passwords.  The easiest technique is: prompt the user for his username and password; reject it so that the user thinks he typed his password wrong; and redirect the user to the legitimate site for his second login attempt, so s/he won&#039;t realize anything is wrong.  The username and password were captured on the dummy site during the first login attempt and can be used by the attacker to log in as the user on the legitimate site.

Having to reach out to the legitimate site to grab the security image and display it on the dummy site in the middle of the login process makes the problem quite a bit harder.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think the point of the images is not to protect against sites that are doing a true man-in-the-middle attack, but rather against sites that are just putting up a look-alike dummy site and collecting usernames and passwords.  The easiest technique is: prompt the user for his username and password; reject it so that the user thinks he typed his password wrong; and redirect the user to the legitimate site for his second login attempt, so s/he won&#8217;t realize anything is wrong.  The username and password were captured on the dummy site during the first login attempt and can be used by the attacker to log in as the user on the legitimate site.</p>
<p>Having to reach out to the legitimate site to grab the security image and display it on the dummy site in the middle of the login process makes the problem quite a bit harder.</p>
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		<title>By: RichC</title>
		<link>http://blog.kamens.us/2009/09/29/password-security-hall-of-shame/comment-page-1/#comment-104993</link>
		<dc:creator>RichC</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2009 03:46:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.kamens.brookline.ma.us/~jik/wordpress/?p=931#comment-104993</guid>
		<description>For those (in)security questions I generate an answer by prepending the key word in the question (&quot;Where was the last place you went on vacation?&quot; -&gt; &quot;vacation&quot;) to a 10+ digit random number I&#039;ve memorized.  

Naive question -- what good are the images at all?  If the evil site is doing a MITM attack it will be able to show you the images, can&#039;t it?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For those (in)security questions I generate an answer by prepending the key word in the question (&#8220;Where was the last place you went on vacation?&#8221; -&gt; &#8220;vacation&#8221;) to a 10+ digit random number I&#8217;ve memorized.  </p>
<p>Naive question &#8212; what good are the images at all?  If the evil site is doing a MITM attack it will be able to show you the images, can&#8217;t it?</p>
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		<title>By: jik</title>
		<link>http://blog.kamens.us/2009/09/29/password-security-hall-of-shame/comment-page-1/#comment-104992</link>
		<dc:creator>jik</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2009 01:34:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.kamens.brookline.ma.us/~jik/wordpress/?p=931#comment-104992</guid>
		<description>Your social security number is not, in fact, &quot;public information.&quot;  Yes, you end up giving them out a lot, and yes, they get compromised a lot by identity thieves, and yes, they&#039;re a bad security token, but the fact of the matter is that most people&#039;s social security numbers have not been compromised, and therefore if the bank must choose a temporary password to use, the last four digits of the SSN are as good a choice as any.

In the spirit of full disclosure, I will mention that when Peoples Federal Savings Bank did exactly the same thing to me in 2001, I went ballistic.  See the full story &lt;a href=&quot;http://stuff.mit.edu/~jik/pfsb_problem/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;, and the first message I sent them about it &lt;a href=&quot;http://stuff.mit.edu/~jik/pfsb_problem/04-web-message-1.txt&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.  However, there was a big difference.  At that time, Massachusetts was using social security numbers as driver&#039;s license numbers by default, and as a result, most people&#039;s SSNs were as close as their wallets.  If a thief stole someone&#039;s wallet, he&#039;d be likely to get both their ATM card &lt;em&gt;and&lt;/em&gt; their SSN, thus giving the thief full access to their account.

I disagree with your assertion that the answers to the security questions are &quot;public knowledge.&quot;  I think the number of people who would be able to determine who your third grade teacher was is rather small, and how could anyone but you know your &quot;favorite vacation spot&quot;?  Besides, if this kind of thing concerns you, then you can make up your own question, or you can just decide what answer you are going to give whenever you have to answer a security question at any site, even if the answer has nothing to do with the question.

I&#039;m a bit conflicted about the security images.  On the one hand, since I don&#039;t fall for phishes or allow the computers I use to get infected with trojans or viruses that would redirect my attempts to contact my bank, those images are never going to provide me with any extra security.  On the other hand, perhaps they do enhance security for people who are stupid enough to fall for phishing messages; of course, they would do that only if said people are smart enough to actually notice if the security image is missing or wrong, and I highly doubt that most people are.  So I suppose you&#039;re right that overall they&#039;re useless.  I wonder if any of the sites that use them have done any real-world research to find out whether they have any benefit.

The thing about reputable companies sending emails with links to third-party Web sites is a huge issue that is reported on over and over again in such forums as the RISK Digest.  Some of those reports have been from me :-).  So I&#039;m totally with you on that.  I simply can&#039;t imagine why there are still companies that are stupid enough to send out emails with links that don&#039;t point back at their domain.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Your social security number is not, in fact, &#8220;public information.&#8221;  Yes, you end up giving them out a lot, and yes, they get compromised a lot by identity thieves, and yes, they&#8217;re a bad security token, but the fact of the matter is that most people&#8217;s social security numbers have not been compromised, and therefore if the bank must choose a temporary password to use, the last four digits of the SSN are as good a choice as any.</p>
<p>In the spirit of full disclosure, I will mention that when Peoples Federal Savings Bank did exactly the same thing to me in 2001, I went ballistic.  See the full story <a href="http://stuff.mit.edu/~jik/pfsb_problem/">here</a>, and the first message I sent them about it <a href="http://stuff.mit.edu/~jik/pfsb_problem/04-web-message-1.txt">here</a>.  However, there was a big difference.  At that time, Massachusetts was using social security numbers as driver&#8217;s license numbers by default, and as a result, most people&#8217;s SSNs were as close as their wallets.  If a thief stole someone&#8217;s wallet, he&#8217;d be likely to get both their ATM card <em>and</em> their SSN, thus giving the thief full access to their account.</p>
<p>I disagree with your assertion that the answers to the security questions are &#8220;public knowledge.&#8221;  I think the number of people who would be able to determine who your third grade teacher was is rather small, and how could anyone but you know your &#8220;favorite vacation spot&#8221;?  Besides, if this kind of thing concerns you, then you can make up your own question, or you can just decide what answer you are going to give whenever you have to answer a security question at any site, even if the answer has nothing to do with the question.</p>
<p>I&#8217;m a bit conflicted about the security images.  On the one hand, since I don&#8217;t fall for phishes or allow the computers I use to get infected with trojans or viruses that would redirect my attempts to contact my bank, those images are never going to provide me with any extra security.  On the other hand, perhaps they do enhance security for people who are stupid enough to fall for phishing messages; of course, they would do that only if said people are smart enough to actually notice if the security image is missing or wrong, and I highly doubt that most people are.  So I suppose you&#8217;re right that overall they&#8217;re useless.  I wonder if any of the sites that use them have done any real-world research to find out whether they have any benefit.</p>
<p>The thing about reputable companies sending emails with links to third-party Web sites is a huge issue that is reported on over and over again in such forums as the RISK Digest.  Some of those reports have been from me <img src='http://blog.kamens.us/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':-)' class='wp-smiley' /> .  So I&#8217;m totally with you on that.  I simply can&#8217;t imagine why there are still companies that are stupid enough to send out emails with links that don&#8217;t point back at their domain.</p>
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		<title>By: Edward Reid</title>
		<link>http://blog.kamens.us/2009/09/29/password-security-hall-of-shame/comment-page-1/#comment-104987</link>
		<dc:creator>Edward Reid</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2009 20:00:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.kamens.brookline.ma.us/~jik/wordpress/?p=931#comment-104987</guid>
		<description>The problem with their temporary passwords (and with most suggested security questions) is that the answers are public information. If it were just something to answer on the spur of the moment, it would be stronger. But they did it in a way that gave attackers potentially weeks to look up the answers. Of course we all feel most strongly about the cases which hit us personally ... I didn&#039;t suffer any harm, but I was &quot;hit&quot; by the fact that two of my accounts were for six weeks protected only by totally public information.

I haven&#039;t seen any publications on how secure these types of measures are. Computer scientists tend to lean toward studying things which have theoretical answers (hey, I understand, I was a math major). Things like the practical ability to connect zip codes, SSNs, and family information are harder to study without actually practicing cracking.

And then there&#039;s the &quot;security image&quot; thing which has become popular recently, which in its current versions (no ability to upload my own image, nor for all practical purpose to choose my image) is probably useful for people with only one online account but nearly useless for those of us with many. To me, those images have already become just more noise on the site. I realize that they have to use something non-textual because otherwise most users would confuse their password and the bank&#039;s password. But for goodness sake, let me tell the bank what pass-image I want them to use.

It&#039;s a slightly different issue, but I just got email from PGP Corp ... with lots of links pointing to manticoretechnology.com, including some which claim to point to PGP.com. I don&#039;t claim there&#039;s anything dangerous about the actual links (Manticore is totally legitimate as far as I can tell), but the &quot;fake link&quot; bit is such a huge issue in phishing that I have to consider it just outright wrong for a company which claims to support security measures to send out fake links.

OK, I&#039;m running off at the fingers and it&#039;s your blog.

Edward</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The problem with their temporary passwords (and with most suggested security questions) is that the answers are public information. If it were just something to answer on the spur of the moment, it would be stronger. But they did it in a way that gave attackers potentially weeks to look up the answers. Of course we all feel most strongly about the cases which hit us personally &#8230; I didn&#8217;t suffer any harm, but I was &#8220;hit&#8221; by the fact that two of my accounts were for six weeks protected only by totally public information.</p>
<p>I haven&#8217;t seen any publications on how secure these types of measures are. Computer scientists tend to lean toward studying things which have theoretical answers (hey, I understand, I was a math major). Things like the practical ability to connect zip codes, SSNs, and family information are harder to study without actually practicing cracking.</p>
<p>And then there&#8217;s the &#8220;security image&#8221; thing which has become popular recently, which in its current versions (no ability to upload my own image, nor for all practical purpose to choose my image) is probably useful for people with only one online account but nearly useless for those of us with many. To me, those images have already become just more noise on the site. I realize that they have to use something non-textual because otherwise most users would confuse their password and the bank&#8217;s password. But for goodness sake, let me tell the bank what pass-image I want them to use.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s a slightly different issue, but I just got email from PGP Corp &#8230; with lots of links pointing to manticoretechnology.com, including some which claim to point to PGP.com. I don&#8217;t claim there&#8217;s anything dangerous about the actual links (Manticore is totally legitimate as far as I can tell), but the &#8220;fake link&#8221; bit is such a huge issue in phishing that I have to consider it just outright wrong for a company which claims to support security measures to send out fake links.</p>
<p>OK, I&#8217;m running off at the fingers and it&#8217;s your blog.</p>
<p>Edward</p>
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		<title>By: jik</title>
		<link>http://blog.kamens.us/2009/09/29/password-security-hall-of-shame/comment-page-1/#comment-104960</link>
		<dc:creator>jik</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 16:33:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.kamens.brookline.ma.us/~jik/wordpress/?p=931#comment-104960</guid>
		<description>Actually, I&#039;ve got to say that all that looks pretty reasonable to me.  I suppose the temporary password thing is a bit weak, and it would have been better if they had mailed random, secure temporary passwords to all of their customers via the U.S. Mail, but it&#039;s not awful.  I think the password and security question policies they posted are actually pretty good as these things go.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Actually, I&#8217;ve got to say that all that looks pretty reasonable to me.  I suppose the temporary password thing is a bit weak, and it would have been better if they had mailed random, secure temporary passwords to all of their customers via the U.S. Mail, but it&#8217;s not awful.  I think the password and security question policies they posted are actually pretty good as these things go.</p>
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		<title>By: Edward Reid</title>
		<link>http://blog.kamens.us/2009/09/29/password-security-hall-of-shame/comment-page-1/#comment-104959</link>
		<dc:creator>Edward Reid</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 16:27:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.kamens.brookline.ma.us/~jik/wordpress/?p=931#comment-104959</guid>
		<description>New nomination: Apple Bank (www.applebank.com). While their normal procedures are no worse than anyone else&#039;s, they made serious errors in transition -- see text below or go to their home page and click on &quot;online login&quot;. Yes, I changed my password before posting this ... but my account sat with this &quot;temporary password&quot; for a month and a half.

============================================

Welcome to Apple Bank’s new, enhanced online banking system

If you have not logged in since September 30th, please pay careful attention to the following instructions before you do so:

User ID Requirements: Your User ID must be 8 to 20 characters in length and must include only letters and numbers. Do not use spaces or special characters. If your User ID already meets these requirements, there is no need to change it. If your User ID does not meet these requirements, please call CustomerLine at the number below to have it changed.

Temporary Password: For security reasons, you will need to use a NEW TEMPORARY PASSWORD to login. Your Temporary Password is the last four digits of your social security number followed by the five-digit zip code on your account. After you login, follow the instructions on choosing a permanent password.

=============================================

Their new password requirement is

You have entered a temporary password. For security purposes, please enter a new password that is between 8 and 32 characters. The password must contain at least one letter, one number and a special character from the following list: 
~`@#$%^&amp;*()_-+={[}]&#124;\:l&quot;&#039;.?/ and space.

===========================================

And then they want an open-ended &quot;security&quot; question -- you make up the question as well as the answer, as if most users had any idea of what a secure question would be, and the examples are the standard fare of basically public information:

===========================================

Before you can access your account information, you must set up a Personal Authentication Question and Answer. This question/answer helps validate your identity so you can immediately create a new password in the event you forget yours.

The question should be easily answered by you but difficult for others to guess. The answer must be 5 to 32 characters and can be a combination of letters, numbers and symbols. Examples of questions and answers:
Question: Who was your third grade teacher? / Answer: Mrs. Simmons
Question: What is my favorite vacation spot? / Answer: Montserrat


Your Personal Authentication Question and Answer should be treated like any other confidential information.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>New nomination: Apple Bank (www.applebank.com). While their normal procedures are no worse than anyone else&#8217;s, they made serious errors in transition &#8212; see text below or go to their home page and click on &#8220;online login&#8221;. Yes, I changed my password before posting this &#8230; but my account sat with this &#8220;temporary password&#8221; for a month and a half.</p>
<p>============================================</p>
<p>Welcome to Apple Bank’s new, enhanced online banking system</p>
<p>If you have not logged in since September 30th, please pay careful attention to the following instructions before you do so:</p>
<p>User ID Requirements: Your User ID must be 8 to 20 characters in length and must include only letters and numbers. Do not use spaces or special characters. If your User ID already meets these requirements, there is no need to change it. If your User ID does not meet these requirements, please call CustomerLine at the number below to have it changed.</p>
<p>Temporary Password: For security reasons, you will need to use a NEW TEMPORARY PASSWORD to login. Your Temporary Password is the last four digits of your social security number followed by the five-digit zip code on your account. After you login, follow the instructions on choosing a permanent password.</p>
<p>=============================================</p>
<p>Their new password requirement is</p>
<p>You have entered a temporary password. For security purposes, please enter a new password that is between 8 and 32 characters. The password must contain at least one letter, one number and a special character from the following list:<br />
~`@#$%^&amp;*()_-+={[}]|\:l&#8221;&#8216;.?/ and space.</p>
<p>===========================================</p>
<p>And then they want an open-ended &#8220;security&#8221; question &#8212; you make up the question as well as the answer, as if most users had any idea of what a secure question would be, and the examples are the standard fare of basically public information:</p>
<p>===========================================</p>
<p>Before you can access your account information, you must set up a Personal Authentication Question and Answer. This question/answer helps validate your identity so you can immediately create a new password in the event you forget yours.</p>
<p>The question should be easily answered by you but difficult for others to guess. The answer must be 5 to 32 characters and can be a combination of letters, numbers and symbols. Examples of questions and answers:<br />
Question: Who was your third grade teacher? / Answer: Mrs. Simmons<br />
Question: What is my favorite vacation spot? / Answer: Montserrat</p>
<p>Your Personal Authentication Question and Answer should be treated like any other confidential information.</p>
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		<title>By: Edward Reid</title>
		<link>http://blog.kamens.us/2009/09/29/password-security-hall-of-shame/comment-page-1/#comment-104868</link>
		<dc:creator>Edward Reid</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2009 03:57:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.kamens.brookline.ma.us/~jik/wordpress/?p=931#comment-104868</guid>
		<description>Add vanguard.com (high). Passwords are case-insensitive and also overly restricted:

Enter a new password of 6 to 10 characters, including 2 letters and 2 numbers. Do not enter your user name, image name, answers to your security questions, spaces, or special characters, such as /&#039;-.&quot;.

With Fidelity already on the shame list, it seems that security is not a well-defined concern in investments.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Add vanguard.com (high). Passwords are case-insensitive and also overly restricted:</p>
<p>Enter a new password of 6 to 10 characters, including 2 letters and 2 numbers. Do not enter your user name, image name, answers to your security questions, spaces, or special characters, such as /&#8217;-.&#8221;.</p>
<p>With Fidelity already on the shame list, it seems that security is not a well-defined concern in investments.</p>
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		<title>By: Edward Reid</title>
		<link>http://blog.kamens.us/2009/09/29/password-security-hall-of-shame/comment-page-1/#comment-104866</link>
		<dc:creator>Edward Reid</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2009 03:44:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.kamens.brookline.ma.us/~jik/wordpress/?p=931#comment-104866</guid>
		<description>My tests conflict with the claim that Wells Fargo maps alphanumeric to keypad. I tried changing one letter to another letter on the same key, changing one letter to the digit on the key, and changing all letters to the corresponding digits. I also tested changing the case of one letter. All tests resulted in login failure.

WF has a separate mobile interface, which I did not attempt to test, since I&#039;m not interested in using it and in any case it does not apply to the standard web interface, since you have to explicitly enable it. Obviously it is possible that different password management might apply there.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My tests conflict with the claim that Wells Fargo maps alphanumeric to keypad. I tried changing one letter to another letter on the same key, changing one letter to the digit on the key, and changing all letters to the corresponding digits. I also tested changing the case of one letter. All tests resulted in login failure.</p>
<p>WF has a separate mobile interface, which I did not attempt to test, since I&#8217;m not interested in using it and in any case it does not apply to the standard web interface, since you have to explicitly enable it. Obviously it is possible that different password management might apply there.</p>
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